Author: Mushirul Hasan,
Publisher: Academy of Third World
Studies, Jamayah Milliyyah Islamiah, New Delhi
Year: 2003
This slim booklet provides a general
overview of Muslim education in contemporary India. The author notes the paucity
of research on the actual living conditions, including state of education, among
the Indian Muslims. State authorities, he says, do not publish data on Muslims,
on ostensible “‘political”
grounds, while Muslim institutions, for their part, have hardly done any
field-based surveys. In this regard, the author points to both “intellectual
lethargy” of sections of the Indian bureaucracy and
political class as well as their resistance to accepting ‘religious minorities’
as a distinct category, because of the fear that “acquiescence
in legitimizing the Muslim minority as a separate entity”
would somehow contravene the notion of an “exclusive
Indian nation”. This fear the author dismisses as
untenable since constitutional guarantees already exist for religious minorities
as well as for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes and the Other Backward Classes.
Muslim educational backwardness, Hasan
says, is largely a product of Muslim poverty and neglect by the state. The vast
majority of the Indian Muslims work as landless labourers, small or marginal
peasants, artisans, petty shopkeepers and the like. More than half the urban
Muslim population lives below the poverty line, and, as compared to Hindus,
proportionately a considerably higher number of Muslims are self-employed. Given
their structural location in the economy and the perception of discrimination,
relatively few Muslims can afford or aspire to higher education. To add to this
is the widespread opposition among many Muslims to higher education for Muslim
girls, who are among the least educated sections of Indian society. It is widely
believed that higher education would diminish girls’ chances of getting good
husbands, given the relative paucity of Muslim men with higher education, and
the fact that less educated men are generally reluctant to marry women who are
better educated than them. Another major cause for Muslim educational
backwardness, particularly in north India, where most Muslims live, are the
systematic discriminatory policies of the state concerning Urdu. Since Urdu is
no longer taught in most state schools and since the language has lost its
earlier organic connection with the economy, it remains largely confined to
madrasas, which is one reason why many Muslim families prefer to send their
children to madrasas than to state schools.
Given the pathetic state of Muslim
education in India, the author stresses the need for affirmative action policies
on the part of the state aimed at promoting education in the community. Short of
reservations for all Muslims, which might prove to be too politically volatile
at this particular juncture, the author calls for the state to extend the
various development projects and schemes that it has launched for the scheduled
castes and tribes to economically deprived sections among the Muslims as well.
Hasan notes that the state has, from time to time, announced various schemes for
“minority development” but
laments that there has been no effective monitoring of their actual
implementation. No one seems to know who the beneficiaries of the schemes are.
Much of the funds released for these projects have remained unutilized; there is
little co-ordination between the union and state government bodies responsible
for implementing them; the schemes are not properly advertised; and there is an
absence of interaction with community leaders about them.
The author also calls for new and more
contextually relevant understandings of Islam and Islamic education for Muslims
to take the question of education more seriously. He approvingly quotes Sir
Sayyad Ahmad Khan, founder of the Aligarh movement, who appealed to Muslims to
modernize their understanding of Islam, believing that the confirmed facts of
science could not have been opposed to Islam as he understood it. This urgent
task, Hasan believes, is fraught with numerous hurdles, not least being the
opposition that it is bound to face from sections of the ‘ulama. In this regard,
he quotes Muhammad Ibrahim, Chairman of the Minorities’ Commission of Madhya
Pradesh, who argues that many ‘ulama have a vested interest in preserving the
madrasas as their strongholds. Many ‘ulama, he says, have little or no
familiarity with the world around them, excel in sectarian controversies and see
“everyone else as ignorant, irreligious and atheistic”. In this regard, Hasan
sees the suspicion with which many ‘ulama have greeted state proposals for
madrasa “modernization” as stemming, in part, from the fear that this might
effectively challenge their monopoly, and provide the state with an excuse to
interfere in their functioning, in particular, in monitoring the funds that they
garner from the public. While this might well be true, it reflects a rather
naïve approach to the state’s overall policy towards the madrasas, which
reflects an understanding that the madrasas need to be brought in line with the
“mainstream”, which is defined in essentially’ upper’ caste Hindu terms. Hasan
also ignores the Hindutva propaganda against the madrasas, which is also
reflected in official pronouncements emanating from top bureaucrats and
government officials with an undisguised sympathy for Hindutva-brand
“nationalism”.
Yet, Hasan also notes with appreciation
that a few ‘ulama do support modern education and, in several states, have
affiliated themselves with state-approved madrasa education boards and,
accordingly, have introduced some basic modern subjects in their curricula. He
is appreciative of the efforts of some ‘ulama to bridge the gap between the
traditional and modern systems of education, and insists on the “desperate need
of a constructive and bold humanism that can restate and reinterpret Islamic
educational ideas in the contemporary social and cultural environment”. He
pleads for what he calls “a fundamental reconstruction of Muslim educational
thought”.
Although Hasan appears critical of the
refusal on the part of many ‘ulama to brook any reforms in the madrasa system,
he insists that the rhetoric about madrasas as training grounds for “terrorists”
is misplaced and erroneous. Despite being “conservative”, they are, Hasan says,
“opposed to fundamentalism”.
What they offer their students, he says, may be the “fulfilment of desires for
individual empowerment, transcendent meaning and social morality that do not
engage directly with national or global politics at all’. The growth in the
numbers of madrasas in recent years, he says, is not because of any conspiracy,
as their detractors allege, but, rather, because the state has not done enough
to promote modern education as well as economic mobility among Muslims.
Consequently, poor Muslims, who cannot afford to send their children to school,
choose to send them to madrasas instead, where they receive free education, and
boarding and lodging. Given the role that madrasas are playing in providing
education to large numbers of Muslims, particularly from poor families, Hasan
appeals for the state to treat the madrasas with “sympathy and understanding,
rather than with suspicion and disdain”. In this way, the state could work along
with the madrasas to promote mutually agreed reforms in their curriculum and
teaching methods.
Hasan concludes this essay by
reiterating his appeal for the state to take a more pro-active role in promoting
modern education and economic development among Muslims. He also appeals for
Muslim community leaders to take the question of education with the seriousness
that it deserves. He calls for the setting up of a Muslim Educational Board to
help promote both reforms in modern schools and madrasas, and suggests that Sufi
shrines and waqf Boards, with the vast money at their disposal, also set up
modern educational institutions catering to the poor among the community.
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