The Qur’ānic text, although it is the Word of God protected
from corruption and human interference, is expressed in human language which is
the Arabic used at the time of revelation of Qur’ān by the Arabs.
Despite its miraculous clarity, its
message could be, and has been, misunderstood by readers on many occasions, in
spite of their good intentions because of their human limitations. There was an
indisputable solution to the problem of interpretation of Qur’ān in the person
of the Prophet (sws) so long as he was alive. He clarified all misunderstandings
about the message of the Qur’ān and Sunnah and gave unquestionable verdicts on
disputes arising in that connection. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, it was an
important part of his Prophetic obligation to clarify the message of the Qur’ān.
With his demise, that important privilege was lost to the Muslims. Ever since,
Muslim scholars have been unable to agree on many, if not most, of the important
issues of Islamic jurisprudence. These differences are neither surprising nor
regrettable. In the absence of a general agreement, however, it is vital to
decide clearly how to deal with them individually as well as collectively. But
before that, a word about the significance of these differences.
Anyone familiar with the work done on the Islamic Sharī‘ah
in the last fourteen hundred years will not hesitate to agree that juristic
differences amongst Muslims scholars are a general rule rather than an
exception. The four famous schools of Islamic jurisprudence are named after the
illustrious jurists who were the originators of their respective schools of
thought. Although they all acknowledge that the Qur’ān is the first source of
the Islamic Sharī‘ah followed by the Sunnah of the Prophet (sws), there are
still considerable differences in the principles they have derived from these
original sources. Amongst these schools, the Hanafites rely mainly on analogy (Qiyās)
and social utility (Istihsān). To the Malikites, an authentic Hadīth from the
Prophet’s companions is more reliable than Qiyās. Moreover, to them, of all the
reports about the practice of the Prophet (sws), the more reliable are those
which are in compliance with the customs and traditions of the inhabitants of
Madīnah, the Prophet’s city. The Shafites acknowledge the superiority of Ijmā‘
(consensus) over a Hadīth transmitted only by a few persons or not confirmed by
several narrators. The Hanbalites’ approach is not very different from the
Shafites’ except that in their view authentic Hadīth is superior to Qiyās, Ijmā‘
or the Prophet’s companion’s own interpretation. Moreover, a part of the
differences among these schools of jurisprudence are attributable to the fact
that they represent attempts to interpret the Sharī‘ah under different set of
circumstances.
The reason why
the number of juristic scholars is not larger than it could be can only be
attributed to the tendency of unquestioned acquiescence to a certain school of
thought (Taqlīd) among a large number of latter-day scholars. Since directly
accessing the original sources began to be considered a prerogative of the
earlier scholars, many of the later doctors of Islamic law faithfully confined
themselves to the task of applying the principles of their predecessors to
contemporary issues. A few exceptions apart, the process has continued until
now. Nevertheless, the differences in the first two centuries of the Muslim
calendar had already assumed such proportions that it can rightfully be claimed
that hardly any important area of Islamic law has remained unaffected.
Now the problem
arises that an individual is bound to confront difficulties in choosing one
point of view from amongst a number of those available in his attempt to follow
the Qur’ān and Sunnah. How can he achieve that objective given the differences
on various issues?
There can be no one answer for all people. For religious
scholars who have the ability to understand the original sources properly, the
only way to follow the Sharī‘ah is to follow it in accordance with their own
understanding of it. Those who do not possess that ability but can still
appreciate the relative strengths of the contesting arguments, the opinion
appearing to be the most convincing should be the one they should follow, even
though that might result in accepting verdicts of different scholars on
different matters. Scholars too will have to adopt this strategy in the areas
they have not researched as yet. If there are individuals who are unable to find
out clearly the most strongly supported case, they may then accept the opinion
of the scholar who enjoys their confidence more because of his good character
and sound knowledge.
Taqlīd, despite being the predominant way of deciding about
a religious verdict amongst a large number of the present-day Muslims, cannot be
justified from the teachings of the Qur’ān and Sunnah. First, because it implies
that those following this approach have taken a decision not to use their own
intellectual abilities. That is clearly against Qur’ān. Second, because it has
to be assumed by those adopting this approach that the scholar they have chosen
to follow is fault-free. There is none, according to the Qur’ān, who is, apart
from the Prophets, divinely guided and, therefore, fault-free. Third, Qur’ān
itself condemns the approach of those who choose to follow others instead of
using their own intellect in religious matters.
_____________________________
|