In the guidance received from God through
His Messengers, the primary status is occupied by the Qur’an
and the Sunnah. I have explained the principles which every
student should keep in mind in order to understand them in the
preamble “Fundamental Principles” of my treatise Islam: A
Comprehensive Introduction.
A summary of these principles can be seen under the same title
in my book Maqamat.
Other than these two sources, if anything can become a
secondary means of understanding the guidance of God, it is
ijtihad. From it, besides many other things, we also try to
understand directives that are not directly covered in these
two sources but are actually the application of what is found
in them and are left to the opinion and comprehension of
people. Qiyas (analogy) is one form of ijtihad. The word used
for it by the Qur’an is istinbat (inference). The content of
this inference is called fiqh (jurisprudence). A large part of
it can be classified as Fiqh al-nabi. The remaining content
consists of the ijtihad done by scholars and jurists. I use
principles of jurisprudence (Usul al-fiqh) to understand and
interpret this content. These principles are as follows:
1. Every opinion about
religion will be formed to fulfil the objective which
according to the Qur’an is the objective of religion. In my
opinion, this objective is the purification of the concepts
and practices related to all matters of a person’s individual
and collective life. In understanding the Hadith literature
related to this content and in accepting or rejecting every
opinion or ijtihad, this objective must be kept in mind as the
fundamental principle.
2. What is implied by
the Qur’an and Sunnah in this sphere of juristic principles is
not only the directives themselves but also the underlying
reason of these directives and those general principles on
which the shari‘ah of God is based. This is regardless of
whether these principles are covered by the sources of
religion or are determined through induction. An example of
the first category is the statement: “God has allowed all pure
and wholesome things and prohibited all impure and unwholesome
things.” An example of the second category is: “All worship
rituals are symbolic expressions of a person’s relationship
with God.”
3. Fiqh is entirely a
corollary of these directives and general principles. It must
remain a corollary in all circumstances. If it exceeds this
status and takes their place or modifies their purport and
impacts them, it will necessarily be rejected.
4. Every directive of
religion has its essence. It is also called meaning and
underlying cause (‘illah). Whether a directive should be
applicable to new situations or should be considered as an
exception or a concession, the decision will be taken on the
basis of this essence.
5. The methods of
reasoning adopted in juristic principles are three:
i. Deducing a
principle from its corollary because if the corollary exists,
the principle must also exist.
ii. Deducing a
corollary from a principle because a principle encompasses a
corollary. Thus if the principle is deliberated upon, it will
apply to all the corollaries it encompasses. It is for this
reason that a principle is called a principle and corollary is
called a corollary.
iii. Deducing a
corollary from another corollary. The method for this would be
to validate the principle. Thus a corollary will first lead to
its principle; then the principle will lead to all its
corollaries.
6. The Prophet’s
juristic understandings (fiqh al-nabi) have an extra-ordinary
status in this discipline. They have mostly been transmitted
through hadith narratives. In order to exercise caution in
attributing them to Prophet Muhammad (sws), they should only
be accepted when in the term of the hadith scholars, they are
at least of the hasan category. If weak narratives are
reported through many variants, they can however be cited in
support of administrative decisions, as a further means of
satisfaction. The reason for this is that in such matters, the
real basis of reasoning is universally acknowledged concepts
derived from sense and reason. What should be done if the
prescribed procedure of divorce is not followed? Whatever is
said in response to this question, it would be of the category
of an administrative decision. Thus if a weak narrative
supports this decision, it will certainly be a means of giving
further satisfaction. The divorce given by Rukanah ibn ‘Abd
Yazid is an example of this decision. It is in this capacity
that I have cited these narratives recorded by Abu Da’ud, Ibn
Majah, Tirmidhi and Musnad Ahmad in the chapter Qanun-i
mu‘asharat (the social shari‘ah) of my book Mizan. I have
specified in a relevant footnote that though these narratives
are weak as far as their chains of narration are concerned,
yet if all of them are collated, this weakness is dispelled.
(Translated by Dr
Shehzad Saleem from Maqamat)
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