[Part 4 of 4]
04. Legislation, a prerogative of ulama?
Our clergy insists that, rather than an elected parliament or legislature consisting of the laity, they must have the right to debate about and interpret the shariah, derive communal laws therefrom, and see them enforced. The principle of amruhum shūrā baynahum, however, rejects this demand. Ulama’s duty, as per the Quran1, is to educate, guide, and advise people by interpreting and explaining their religion, not to impose their views on them. No legislation, secular or religious, can thus be done and enforced contrary to the consent and choice of Muslims or their representatives.
This proposition does not imply, as commonly misunderstood in the Indian subcontinent, that the parliament should assume the role of a mujtahid (i.e., in this context, an interpreter of the shariah). Far from it. What it implies is that, like in all other fields, ulama as doctors of religion will present their interpretations and opinions to the parliament. The parliament, as a body of people’s representatives, will then decide which interpretation to accept and which to reject for law-making .
By the same token, some argue that neither people nor their ignorant representatives have the capacity to decide what is right for them; therefore, only experts and intellects ought to have the prerogative to legislate. God, as we have seen, rejects such oligarchy (42:38). Being better informed, intelligentsia’s duty is to educate, guide, and counsel people, not to snatch their basic human-right of self-determination. Even in the matter as important as religion, God has given people the right to choose. This implies that, contrary to what such oligarchists claim, all humans have a capacity to understand even something as complex as theology and discern truth from falsehood . It is, in fact, an insult to human intellect to think otherwise. It is also worth noting that better information is no guarantee of better decision-making for others. Monarchs, for instance, are much better informed than laypersons but history is witness that, exploiting the very information, they and their agents usurp the rights and resources of people. Hence, the best way forward is that people – whose rights, interests, and welfare collective matters relate to – decide for themselves, and in case of disagreement, resolve it through a majority vote.
Even if a legitimate parliament, to ulama’s greatest fear, decides to legislate against or ignoring the shariah – an act equated by the Quran (5:44) with disbelief – God has not given a minority or ulama the right to stop them by force. As teachers and heirs of prophets, ulama ought to earnestly remind their nation of the teachings of Islam; elaborate the rationale and arguments behind them; address any concerns and doubts about them; invite to truth with wisdom, compassion, and goodwill; but, then, rather than acting as a warder over people, let them freely accept or reject their call.2 The more Islam there is in the hearts of people, the more it will reflect in their collective system. This only is the natural, robust, durable, and peaceful way to make religion part and parcel of individual and collective lives of people.3
Some religious evidence, however, is often cited to imply that it is a duty of true believers to enforce the shaira on the majority, whether it likes it or not. In the text to follow, we shall turn to such evidence and see what it implies.
05. ‘Commanding’ good and curbing evil by force
The Quran says:
وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ وَالْمُؤْمِنَاتُ بَعْضُهُمْ أَوْلِيَاءُ بَعْضٍ، يَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ. (التوبہ ٩: ٧١)
The believing men and women are allies of one another. [Unlike the Hypocrites], they encourage good and forbid evil. (9:71)
وَلْتَکُنْ مِّنْکُمْ اُمَّۃٌ یَّدْعُوْنَ اِلَی الْخَیْرِ وَیَاْمُرُوْنَ بِالْمَعْرُوْفِ وَ یَنْھَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْکَرِ، وَاُولٰٓئِکَ ھُمُ الْمُفْلِحُوْنَ. (آل عمران ٣: ١٠٤)
There must be a group appointed from among you, inviting to righteousness, encouraging good, and forbidding evil. [You should diligently do so], and [remember that] they [who do so] are the ones to attain felicity. (3:104)
The Prophet (ﷺ) said:
مَنْ رَأَى مِنْكُمْ مُنْكَرًا فَلْيُغَيِّرْهُ بِيَدِهِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَسْتَطِعْ فَبِلِسَانِهِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَسْتَطِعْ فَبِقَلْبِهِ، وَذَلِكَ أَضْعَفُ الْإِيمَانِ. (المسلم، رقم ١٧٧)
‘He among you who sees an evil ought to rectify it with his hands; if he finds no courage therefor, with his tongue or, at least, he must detest it in his heart, and that is the lowest degree of faith.’ (, no. 177)
Based on such verses4 and this hadith, it is argued that true believers must command others to do good and stop them by force whenever they are found indulged in evil. Thus, if Muslims are not living by the shariah in individual or collective matters, they shall be forced to do so. It is irrelevant how few such believers are and whether they have a legal authority; whenever possible, they will attempt to fulfil this obligation.
Such an anarchist interpretation is far from the teachings and principles of God’s religion and practice of His prophets (, pp. 557-560):
First, the word 'يَأمُرون' (ya'murūn; root: amr) in such verses does not imply ‘commanding’, but politely inviting and urging each other to good. To ‘recommend’, ‘advice’, or ‘urge’ is a popular meaning of this word, which we know is intended here because both common sense and evidence from within the Quran suggest that: We cannot order but only advise others to, say, speak the truth, love God, help the needy, and so on . At another place (3:103), therefore, the Quran has substituted the word ‘ya'murūn’ with 'تَواصَوا' (tawāṣaw, i.e., to advise each other) while instructing believers to do good and advise each other to patiently adhere to truth and righteousness.
Second, the words used for good ("مَعروف"; ma’rūf) and evil ("مُنكَر"; munkar) signify universally acknowledged good and evil, e.g., truth and lie, charity and theft, honesty and dishonesty, kindness and cruelty, decency and indecency etc. They do not refer to, for instance, listening to music, which may be forbidden in one’s eyes and permissible in another’s. Similarly, they do not stand for rulings of the shariah (; , p. 265). That is why the same words are used in the Quran (3:110-115) for People of the Book’s call to good and forbiddance from evil.
Third, addressees of the verses 9:71 and 3:104 are not the same. It is evident that the first pertains to individual believers. The second, in contrast, lays down an obligation to be discharged by rulers, on behalf of the entire Muslim community (See also 22:41). Thus, when these verses speak of forbidding evil, its method cannot be identical. In both the cases, it will be forbidden by the word of mouth, with due wisdom, courtesy, and good will.5 However, as for using force therefor, a state institution like that of police can certainly do that, but not individuals with no legal authority over others. The Quran, the Scriptures and history bear witness that without political authority, God did not allow any of his prophets to eradicate evil from the society by force.
Likewise, curbing an evil by acting against it, as indicated in the above hadith, pertains to an individual’s sphere of authority. For instance, as a head of family, organisation, or state, a person is obliged to take a due action against a universally-agreed evil or crime, such as theft, fraud, perfidy, adulteration, bullying, harassment, or violence. In one’s sphere of authority, therefore, if one fails to do so without a valid reason but lack of courage, it definitely implies lack of faith. Thus, at another occasion, the Prophet more explicitly said:
أَلاَ كُلُّكُمْ رَاعٍ، وَكُلُّكُمْ مَسْئُولٌ عَنْ رَعِيَّتِهِ، فَالإِمَامُ الَّذِي عَلَى النَّاسِ رَاعٍ وَهْوَ مَسْئُولٌ عَنْ رَعِيَّتِهِ، وَالرَّجُلُ رَاعٍ عَلَى أَهْلِ بَيْتِهِ وَهْوَ مَسْئُولٌ عَنْ رَعِيَّتِهِ، وَالْمَرْأَةُ رَاعِيَةٌ عَلَى أَهْلِ بَيْتِ زَوْجِهَا وَوَلَدِهِ وَهِيَ مَسْئُولَةٌ عَنْهُمْ، وَعَبْدُ الرَّجُلِ رَاعٍ عَلَى مَالِ سَيِّدِهِ وَهْوَ مَسْئُولٌ عَنْهُ، أَلاَ فَكُلُّكُمْ رَاعٍ وَكُلُّكُمْ مَسْئُولٌ عَنْ رَعِيَّتِهِ. (البخاری، رقم ٧١٣٨)
‘Each one of you is a shepherd, responsible for one’s flock. A ruler is a shepherd over people and is responsible for them. A man is a shepherd over his family and is responsible for it. A woman is a shepherd of her husband's house and children, and is responsible for them. A slave is a shepherd of his master's property and is responsible for it. So, all of you are shepherds, responsible for your flocks.’ (, no. 7138)
Without such traditional or legal authority, however, using force to curb, crush, or punish evil itself is evil, yielding nothing but anarchy.
The worst of all wrongs is polytheism (Quran 4:48). Yet while living in Mecca, the Messenger of God (ﷺ) and his Companions (رضي الله عنهم) never used force to stop the Polytheists from practicing polytheism. So much so that the Prophet prayed amid the idols placed in and around Caaba – the first mosque and a centre of monotheism – but never attempted to destroy them. Does it imply that, according to the above hadith, they had a lower degree of faith? Not at all; they were adherent followers of the Quran (6:107): ‘Had God willed, they [the Quraysh] could never have been idolatrous. We have not set you [O Muhammad] a keeper over them, nor are you responsible for them.’
Later, however, when God granted political authority to believers, the Prophet, as a head of state, did take authoritative measures to curb crime and delinquency. In addition, God obliged the Prophet and his Companions to eradicate polytheism and subdue other religions in the Arabian Peninsula. This obligation, nevertheless, has nothing to do with us, as it pertains to a specific ruling of God regarding obstinate deniers among the direct addressees of a messenger (See the next section).
To conclude, all believers are obliged to invite to good and humbly forbid from evil, as well-wishers of each other. As for using force to stop evil, it depends on whether one has due authority. In the capacity of, for example, a parent or an executive, one is expected to act against a wrongdoing, out of one’s normative or legal authority over certain individuals. Similarly, if believers have a collective system, those at the helm of affairs are obliged to curb crime and injustice by force, as and when required. But, as an individual, the directive of Islam for a believer is no more than that for the Prophet as he lived as a preacher in Mecca: ‘So remind, [O Muhammad]; you are only a reminder. You are not at all a warder over them.’ (Quran 88:21-22).
06. Dominance of Islam in the world
هُوَ الَّذِي أَرْسَلَ رَسُولَهُ بِالْهُدَىٰ وَدِينِ الْحَقِّ لِيُظْهِرَهُ عَلَى الدِّينِ كُلِّهِ وَلَوْ كَرِهَ الْمُشْرِكُونَ. (الصف ٦١: ٩)
He is the one who has sent His Messenger with [pure] guidance and true religion to make it prevail over all religions, however hateful this may be to these Polytheists. (Quran 61:9)6
Based on this verse, it is argued that God sent the Prophet (ﷺ) to ensure Islam’s dominance over all other worldviews, religions, and ideologies. He accomplished that not only by peacefully inviting people to Islam but by using force, too, when necessary. True believers, therefore, must follow in his footsteps and struggle likewise for the dominance of Islamic law in Muslim countries as well as the rest of the world.
As for using force, it needs to be remembered that the Prophet and his Companions (رضي الله عنهم) received the political authority of Medina merely through preaching. As Medinan chiefs accepted Islam, they invited the Prophet to migrate to Medina and take charge as the head of state. Thereafter, believers were permitted for the first time to fight the Meccans in self-defence (Quran 22:39-40). Without political authority, neither Muhammad (ﷺ) in Mecca nor Moses (ﷺ) in Egypt7 was permitted to take up arms. Jesus (ﷺ) and other messengers faced severe persecution by the most wicked, but there was no question of retaliation. Thus, no matter how noble a cause may be, religion of God never allows any armed struggle without a legitimate government. Such a government is needed to decide, as a true representative of believers, when and when not to fight as per the injunctions of God; maintain control and discipline within its army; keep a check on war crimes; ensure respect of treaties, non-combatants, and prisoners of war; avoid anarchy, and so on (See “Islāmi Inqilāb” in , pp. 296-309). The Prophet, therefore, said:
إِنَّمَا الإِمَامُ جُنَّةٌ، يُقَاتَلُ مِنْ وَرَائِهِ وَيُتَّقَى بِهِ. (البخاری، رقم ٢٩٥٧)
Indeed, the ruler [of Muslims] is their shield. An armed struggle is only launched under him, and in him refuge is taken [during that]. (, no. 2957)
Let us now come to the prevalence of Islam over all other religions, as mentioned in 61:9:
Some time after permitting jihad for self-defence, God made fighting an obligation for the Medinan state for two purposes: a) to eradicate religious oppression and persecution, and b) to punish those who obstinately rejected the call of Muhammad (ﷺ), even after fully recognising him as an ambassador of God (Quran 2:190-194).
For the first cause, Muslims of all times can and, sometimes, must take up arms under a legitimate ruler. The second cause, however, is specific to messengers (rusul) and their companions: When a messenger (rasūl) of God makes truth plain insomuch that his addressees are left with no excuse to reject it, the rejecters are severely punished right in this world. It is a fixed law of God, necessarily manifesting towards the end of a rasūl’s career. Thus, the people of Noah, Hud, Ṣāliḥ, Lot, Shuʿayb (ﷺ), and Pharaoh, for example, were at last destroyed through natural forces. By the same token, the persistent Polytheists and People of the Book in and around Arabia were also punished, albeit at the hands of God’s last Rasūl and his Companions.8 A different method was adopted in the last case because, unlike other messengers, Muhammad (ﷺ) not only had political freedom and authority but sufficient resources to fulfil this purpose. Such punishment results in the political and religious dominance of messengers and their companions, and annihilation or complete submission of their opponents (Quran 14:9-14). The verse under discussion (61:9) alludes to such dominance. At other places, this law of God is explicated as follows:
إِنَّ الَّذِينَ يُحَادُّونَ اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ أُولَٰئِكَ فِي الْأَذَلِّينَ. كَتَبَ اللَّهُ لَأَغْلِبَنَّ أَنَا وَرُسُلِي، إِنَّ اللَّهَ قَوِيٌّ عَزِيزٌ. (المجادلة ٥٨: ٢٠-٢١)
Those who oppose God and His Messenger shall be among the most humiliated, for God has written: ‘Certainly, My messengers and I shall prevail.’ Indeed, God is all-powerful and almighty. (58:20-21)
أَلَمْ يَأْتِكُمْ نَبَأُ الَّذِينَ مِنْ قَبْلِكُمْ قَوْمِ نُوحٍ وَعَادٍ وَثَمُودَ؟ [...] وَقَالَ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا لِرُسُلِهِمْ لَنُخْرِجَنَّكُمْ مِنْ أَرْضِنَا أَوْ لَتَعُودُنَّ فِي مِلَّتِنَا ۖ فَأَوْحَىٰ إِلَيْهِمْ رَبُّهُمْ لَنُهْلِكَنَّ الظَّالِمِينَ. وَلَنُسْكِنَنَّكُمُ الْأَرْضَ مِنْ بَعْدِهِمْ. (ابراھیم ١٤: ٩-١٤)
Have the accounts of your predecessors not reached you: the people of Noah, the ‘Ād, and the Thamud, and those who succeeded them? […] [At last], the rejecters [among them] told their messengers, ‘We shall expel you from our land, or you have to return to our religion.’ Thereupon, their Lord inspired to [the messengers], ‘We will destroy these wrongdoers and settle you in this land after them.’ (14:9-14)
Regarding such punishment, the Quran (17:15) proclaims:
وَمَا كُنَّا مُعَذِّبِينَ حَتَّىٰ نَبْعَثَ رَسُولًا. (الإسراء ١٧: ١٥)
And never would We punish [a people] until We sent a messenger [to fully unveil truth to them].
Such dominance of messengers and punishment of their opponents, therefore, is an exclusive law of God.9 This implies that it cannot be generalised to justify contemporary armed struggles for Islam’s dominance over other religions. In 61:9, ‘all religions’ refers to religions prevailing in the Arabian Peninsula, i.e., the religions of direct addressees of a messenger. It was a prophecy, which was fulfilled in the lifetime of the Prophet. Later, however, the Companions also launched offensives against rulers of the surrounding kingdoms. These rulers rejected Islam despite being invited by a messenger and seeing undisputable evidence of his messengership. Thus, as per the same law, God made these offensives successful and granted Islam dominance there, too. Beyond these territories, however, the Companions waged no war for this purpose, nor did Islam conquer all religions then present in the world.
To conclude, therefore, 61:9 does not lay down any general ruling but pertains to a law of God specific to His messengers and their companions. For fulfilling the wish of Islam’s dominance, the only jihad (endeavour) that Muslims of all times should undertake is what the Quran (25:52) calls the ‘great jihad’ of preaching (For details, see , pp. 580-610; “Tāwīl kī Ghalaṭī” in , pp. 169-180).
Let us use this opportunity to analyse another verse, oft-quoted in this context:
أَنْ أَقِيمُوا الدِّينَ وَلَا تَتَفَرَّقُوا فِيهِ. (الشورى ٤٢: ١٣)
Uphold the religion and be not divided therein. (Quran 42:13)
The word we have translated ‘uphold’ is 'أَقيمُوا', which is translated by some exegetes as ‘establish’. As a consequence, it is claimed that this verse directs Muslims to enforce religion (shariah) in the entire world (See commentary on this verse in ).
According to linguistic rules, however, such connotation is impossible here. The verse, instead, directs believers to keep their religion straight and uphold it, in spirit and letter, in their individual and collective lives.10 Regarding the collective injunctions of Islam, such as jihad and penal shariah, it needs to be emphasised that they only become applicable if Muslims happen to have a collective system (state). In such a system, these injunctions are to be exclusively executed by and under their elected rulers. It is apparent from the Quran and the Hadith that individuals and non-state groups are not their addressees. This is an agreed understanding of classical exegetes and jurists, which is challenged in the present times for no reasonable reasons (, p. 582 & 612).
Here, it is also important to realise that the Islamic shariah by-definition is a religious law and is, therefore, only applicable to Muslims. Since 'there is no compulsion in religion' (2:256), it cannot be enforced on non-Muslims.
07. Revolt against rulers ‘who do not judge by the law revealed by God’
The preceding discussion may help us deal with another misconception: The Prophet (ﷺ) said, 'Whoever changes their religion, kill them’ (, no. 3017). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the Quran (5:44) says, ‘Those who do not judge by the law revealed by God are [truly] disbelievers’. From these rulings, it is inferred that those Muslim rulers who turn their backs on the shariah are apostates and, therefore, deserve to be overthrown and killed.
If this hadith is seen in light of the Quran, it becomes clear that it is not a general ruling. Instead, it is a corollary of the punishment for the persistent deniers of a messenger from among his direct addressees. In conformity with this punishment – a special law of God (previous section) – God ordained death penalty for the Polytheists of Arabia. They could, however, avoid this penalty by repenting from polytheism and embracing God’s religion (Quran 9:3-5). But how about those who, after accepting Islam, would revert to polytheism? Obviously, the averted death penalty should have been meted out to them, and that is exactly what the Prophet decreed. This ruling, therefore, was specific to such Polytheists. It has nothing to do with disbelievers, polytheists, and apostates of our time, including those Muslim rulers who refuse to judge by the law revealed by God (See , 139-143).
In case of such open disbelief11 by rulers, however, their obedience does not remain a religious obligation for Muslims, and a struggle (revolt) may be launched to overthrow them. That is because the Quran’s directive to ‘obey […] those given authority among you’ (4:59) pertains to the rulers subservient to God and His Messenger. Thus, they certainly lose their religious right of being obeyed as they cross a certain limit. Explicitly, that is, if they approve a law or give an edict obliging a believer to transgress against God, or if they openly renounce Islam. In the first case, a believer must humbly refuse to obey the particular edict and bravely face any consequences of non-compliance (, no. 4763). The second case, on the other hand, even makes revolt permissible. Thus, the Prophet explained:
إِلَّا أَنْ تَرَوْا كُفْرًا بَوَاحًا، عِنْدَكُمْ مِنْ اللَّهِ فِيهِ بُرْهَانٌ. (البخاری، رقم ٧٠٥٦)
‘[You may challenge your rulers’ authority] in case you witness open disbelief from them, and you have indisputable evidence from God to establish that [such has indeed occurred].’ (, no. 7056)
But even after such disbelief, revolt can only be staged 1) against an authoritarian regime and 2) in leadership of a person backed by a clear majority of Muslims. Otherwise, it would not only be a revolt against a regime (government) but Muslims and their collective system (state). The latter is a capital crime, for it falls under what the Quran (5:33) refers to as ‘spreading disorder on the earth’ (See , no. 4798). Furthermore, in case of an armed revolt, all conditions and principles prescribed in Islam for jihad must also be fulfilled.
It is important to note that revolt can be either permissible or impermissible but neither obligatory nor desirable in religion, for it puts lives, wealth, infrastructure, and the entire collective system at stake.12 So, even after an outright rejection of Islam by their rulers, Muslims may well decide not to rebel, but exhort them to mend ways, peacefully leave the rulership, or come to some reasonable agreement. Even if nothing works, they may keep living under them as long as they are not forced to give up faith or its practice. That being the case, religion requires them to, whenever possible, migrate to another place where they may live in accordance with their faith and conscience (, pp. 77-78). Such persecution, however, obliges other polities of Muslims to wage jihad, if possible, and deliver their brethren from such despots (, pp. 595-596).
In case not only their rulers or representatives but a majority of a Muslim population descends to open disbelief, believers are only required to, as mentioned earlier, invite them to God’s path with wisdom, compassion, and goodwill. Commoners aside, even messengers of God were never allowed to assume a warder’s role over their people (For details, see “Islāmi Inqilāb” in , pp. 296-309)
1 See 9:122, 16:125-126 & 88:21-22.
2 For details, see , pp. 552-557 & 560-579.
3 See “Nafādh-i Shari‘at”, “Islāmī Hukumat”, and “Islām awr Riyāsat” in , pp. 239-245, 191-195 & 196-208, respectively.
4 The following words, more or less, are common in such verses: 'وَيَأمُرونَ بِالمَعروفِ وَيَنهَونَ عَنِ المُنكَرِ'. The word 'يَأمُرون' (ya'murūn) here is often translated as ‘they order/command’ instead of, as we have suggested, ‘they encourage’.
5 As per the method instituted by the Prophet (ﷺ), Muslim rulers are obliged to use the Friday sermon to invite people to good and forbid them from evil.
6 This verse also occurs at two other places in the Quran, 9:33 & 48:28.
7 Later, however, as Moses and his followers formed a polity following the divine destruction of the pharaoh, jihad was rendered obligatory for them in the Torah (See Deuteronomy).
8 See Chapter 9 of the Quran, esp. 9:3-5, 9:14 & 9:29.
9 The rationale behind such reward and punishment (miniature worldly judgement) is to substantiate for humankind the basic claim of religion, viz. the existence of a just God and the advent of a day when the entire humankind shall be judged likewise, based on their moral conduct (, pp. 169-174).
10 For a detailed discussion, see “Tāwīl kī Ghalaṭī” in , pp. 169-180.
11 Open disbelief implies such unequivocal expression of disbelief that leaves no room for doubt or debate that apostasy has, indeed, taken place . An example is an outright rejection of any of the basic tenets of Islam, e.g., belief in God, His messengers, the Day of Judgement, and so on. As mentioned in the text, a tacit or explicit refusal to legislate, run collective affairs, or settle disputes according to the directives of Islam is also an instance of open disbelief (Quran 5:44). A historical example thereof is the constitutional secularism of Turkey, introduced by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (d. 1938) .
The situation in most Muslim-majority states, however, is not the same. Therein, Muslims and their representatives accept the communal law of God and wish to live by it. Yet, there exist confusions or reservations about it, and those at the helm of affairs confront serious problems when it comes to its implementation. The problem, in fact, lies with the mainstream interpretation of the shariah. Therefore, the need is to pinpoint flaws in that with an open heart and mind, purge it of these, and re-educate people about the law of God. Without such an exercise, as Iqbal (d. 1938)  indicated in his renowned lectures on Islam, enforcement of the traditional understanding of the shariah in a present-day state is but a daydream .
As another case in point, the view that part of the shariah (e.g., penal shariah) is not static but moveable (i.e., subject to change), as held by Iqbal , cannot also be termed open disbelief. Rather than apostasy, it is a matter of understanding of religion, requiring debate and discussion (Ghamidi, pers. comm). Similar is the case of belief in the continuance of waḥī (revelation) even after the discontinuance of prophethood, as professed by the Sufis and Ahmadiyya Muslims.
12 Admittedly, it is so in the case of jihad as well, but the risk is much lower because jihad-proper is done under a state system; approval of an elected government; organised army; state law; better means to assess resources, handle information, calculate the probability of success/failure, and so on (Ghamidi, pers. comm).
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 S. A. A. Maududi, Tafhīm Al-Qur’ān, 6 vols. Lahore: Idārah Tarjumān Al-Qur’ān, 1985.
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